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Judicial Takings in Vandevere v. Lloyd
I. INTRODUCTION
In Vandevere v. Lloyd,1 the Ninth Circuit created a circuit split by
changing its test for determining which property interests are
protected under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. With the
First Circuit applying federal constitutional law and the Ninth
Circuit applying state law, the Ninth Circuit’s new test conflicts with
Supreme Court precedents that the First Circuit follows.2 The Ninth
Circuit in Vandevere considered whether some of Alaska’s
regulations on commercial salmon fishing, which shortened fishing
seasons, reduced fishing areas, and limited fishing for various salmon
species, violated the Takings Clause.3 Commercial fishermen claimed
that the regulations severely diminished the value of their entry
permits by limiting the number of fish they could catch and sell.4
Although claiming to follow the Supreme Court’s decision in Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council 5 and its own decision in Schneider
v. California Department of Corrections,6 the Ninth Circuit applied a
new Takings Clause analysis in which “state law governs the
demarcation of a property right, while federal law governs the
manner in which the state must respect” that right.7 Deferring
entirely to the Alaska Supreme Court’s holding in a nearly identical
case,8 the Ninth Circuit then held that the fishermen’s entry permits
were “not property for purposes of a takings claim.”9

1. Vandevere v. Lloyd, 644 F.3d 957 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 850 (2011).
2. See Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. (Schneider II), 151 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 1998);
Hoffman v. City of Warwick, 909 F.2d 608 (1st Cir. 1990).
3. Vandevere, 644 F.3d at 959, 961–62.
4. Two types of permit-holding fishermen challenged the regulations: (1) fishermen
who hold entry permits to use drift gillnets, and (2) fishermen who own leaseholds to
submerged lands and hold entry permits to place set gillnets on those lands. Id. at 961.
5. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
6. Vandevere, 644 F.3d at 966 (“In any event, Schneider is the law of our circuit and
we are bound to follow it.” (citing Schneider II, 151 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 1998)).
7. Id. at 964.
8. See Vanek v. State, 193 P.3d 283, 285 (Alaska 2008).
9. Vandevere, 644 F.3d at 967.

423

CLEMENTS.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

3/20/2012 11:33 AM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2012

This Note argues that the Ninth Circuit in Vandevere incorrectly
applied both the Supreme Court’s Lucas line of cases and its own
precedent in Schneider. The Ninth Circuit distorted existing Takings
Clause analysis to produce a rule that conflicts not only with its own
precedent and that of the First Circuit, but also with Supreme Court
precedents. Additionally, the court’s failure to independently
examine the nature and extent of rights that Alaska law created in
entry permits effectively permitted a judicial taking of private
property without just compensation.10
Part II of this Note explains relevant legal principles for
determining whether an interest is property for Takings Clause
purposes by examining the regulatory-takings jurisprudence of the
Supreme Court, the First Circuit, and the Ninth Circuit. Part III
describes the facts and procedural history of Vandevere. Part IV
summarizes the court’s reasoning and decision in Vandevere. Part V
analyzes Vandevere: first, it shows how the Ninth Circuit misapplied
Lucas and Schneider; second, it demonstrates why the two elements
in a proper Takings Clause inquiry logically and constitutionally
cannot be hermetically sealed off from one another as separate
inquiries without reaching absurd results; and third, it argues that
the Vandevere rule facilitates judicial takings. Part VI concludes.
II. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND11
The Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, applied to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment,12 provides that private
property must not “be taken for public use, without just
compensation.”13 A person cannot receive compensation for an

10. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct.
2592, 2601–02 (2010) (plurality opinion) (recognizing existence of judicial taking of private
property).
11. On December 1, 2011, this Note’s author emailed the fishermen’s attorney, Arthur
S. Robinson, while the petition for certiorari was still pending before the U.S. Supreme Court.
Mr. Robinson’s paralegal responded: “You make reference to a note to be published. Is there
anything in that note that might help us in the reply we intend to send to the printer today?”
This author gladly sent this Note in its first draft and was pleased to learn that substantial
portions of his work were used in writing the Petitioners’ Reply Brief. Compare Petitioners’
Reply Brief at 4–7, Vandevere v. Lloyd, No. 11-455, 2011 WL 6069614, 2011 U.S. S. Ct.
Briefs LEXIS 2466 (U.S. Dec. 5, 2011), with infra Parts II.A–C, IV.A.2, V.A–B, VI.
12. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 536 (2005).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. V.

424

CLEMENTS.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

423

3/20/2012 11:33 AM

Judicial Takings in Vandevere v. Lloyd

alleged taking, however, unless he has a “Takings Clause-recognized
property interest.”14 This Part addresses how the Supreme Court, the
First Circuit, and the Ninth Circuit have determined what qualifies
as property for Takings Clause analysis.
A. Supreme Court Precedents
The Supreme Court has established two categories of per se
takings that almost always require compensation: (1) regulations that
cause a permanent physical invasion of the property and (2)
regulations that deprive an owner of all beneficial use of the
property.15 “Outside these two relatively narrow categories,”
regulatory takings claims, such as when a regulation severely
diminishes property values, are decided according to the principles
found in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.16
Additionally, a plurality of the Court has recognized the possibility
of a judicial taking of private property.17
In Lucas v. South Carolina Costal Council, the Supreme Court
held that a state regulation depriving a landowner of all beneficial use
of his property amounted to a taking without just compensation
under the Fifth Amendment.18 The state could avoid compensation
only by pointing to “background principles” of nuisance and
property law allowing the regulatory diminution in the land’s value.19
Following Lucas, courts and scholars debated the meaning of
background principles, and whether these principles included “(1)
statutory law, as opposed to just common law; (2) recently enacted
law, as opposed to just vintage law rooted in age-old legal tradition;
and (3) federal law, as opposed to just state law.”20 One scholar has
argued that Lucas’ text alone makes clear that the “state-law-only

14. Robert Meltz, Takings Law Today: A Primer for the Perplexed, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q.
307, 317 (2007).
15. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538.
16. Id. (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)).
17. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592,
2602 (2010) (plurality opinion).
18. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
19. Id. at 1029.
20. Meltz, supra note 14, at 353.
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view is incorrect because it ignores Lucas’ explicit mention of the
federal navigation servitude.”21
In its Penn Central-type cases, the Court has recognized various
factors for determining whether one has a property interest and
whether state regulations have effected a taking. Some of these
factors include the regulation’s “economic effect” on the person,
“the extent to which the regulation interferes with reasonable
investment-backed expectations, and the character of the
government action.”22 However, the Court has also stated that
“property is more than economic value; it also consists of ‘the group
of rights which the so-called owner exercises in his dominion of the
physical thing,’ such ‘as the right to possess, use and dispose of it.’”23
And in a principal case relied on by the Ninth Circuit, Justice Souter
stated the following:
It thus makes good sense to consider what is property only in
connection with what is a compensable taking, an approach to Fifth
Amendment analysis that . . . would . . . reduce the risk of placing
such undue emphasis on the existence of a generalized property
right as to distort the taking and compensation analyses that
necessarily follow before the Fifth Amendment’s significance can be
known.24

For judicial takings, a plurality of the Court suggested that the
inquiry “is not whether there is precedent for the allegedly
confiscatory decision, but whether the property right allegedly taken
was established” under state law.25 This is because independent
21. Id.
22. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001) (citing Penn Cent. Transp.
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978)).
23. Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 170 (1998) (citations omitted)
(quoting United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378, 380 (1945)).
24. Id. at 175 (Souter, J., dissenting); cf. Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v.
United States, 409 U.S. 470, 482–83 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that although
“the inquiry as to what property interest is taken by the condemnor and the inquiry as to how
that property interest shall be valued are not identical ones, they cannot be divorced without
seriously undermining a number of rules dealing with the law of eminent domain”).
25. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592,
2610 (2010) (plurality opinion); see Eduardo M. Peñalver & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Judicial
Takings or Due Process?, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 305, 367–68 (2012) (proposing as elements for
judicial-takings test “(1) the government’s intention to appropriate the property for a public
purpose, (2) the involvement of repeat players in the state-court proceedings giving rise to the
complaint about judicial appropriation, (3) whether the government retains the property in
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sources, such as state law, are the basis for the “existing rules or
understandings” that create and define property interests by securing
certain benefits and supporting “claims of entitlement to those
benefits.”26 It should remain clear, however, that “the meaning of
‘property’ as used in the Fifth Amendment [is] a federal question,”
despite “obtain[ing] its content by reference to local law.”27
Furthermore, the plurality stated that federal courts can enforce the
Takings Clause only if “they have the power to decide what property
rights exist under state law,” thus allowing them to review
judgments of state supreme courts.28 In sum, Supreme Court
precedents suggest that the property inquiry is very fact specific and
often requires considering various sources of law.
B. First Circuit Precedent
The First Circuit’s Takings Clause analysis follows Supreme
Court precedent. In its 1990 opinion in Hoffman v. City of
Warwick,29 the First Circuit considered whether veterans who
challenged Rhode Island’s repeal of a statute that granted “enhanced
seniority in employment for returning war veterans”30 had a
constitutionally protected property interest for a takings claim. When
the federal district court discovered that the Rhode Island Supreme
Court had a similar case pending before it, the district court stayed
the veterans’ case until the state court had entered its decision.31 The
Rhode Island Supreme Court subsequently held that the repealed
statute “merely created gratuities or floating expectancies,” and that
the veterans had no vested property interest in enhanced seniority
unless they had started receiving the increased pay before the
statute’s repeal.32

question for a public use, and (4) the existence of any coordination between the judiciary and
another branch”).
26. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
27. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266 (1946) (quoting United States v.
Powell, 319 U.S. 266, 279 (1943)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
28. Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2609.
29. Hoffman v. City of Warwick, 909 F.2d 608 (1st Cir. 1990).
30. Id. at 611.
31. Id. at 613.
32. Id. at 613–14 (quoting Brennan v. Kirby, 529 A.2d 633, 641 (R.I. 1987)).
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Though it dismissed the case on other grounds, the First Circuit
rejected the notion that it was bound by the decision of the state
supreme court. The court stated that the mere fact that state law
creates the property interest does not necessarily mean that “the state
has the final say as to whether that interest is a property right for
federal constitutional purposes.”33 The court concluded that “federal
constitutional law determines whether the interest created by the
state rises to the level of ‘property,’ entitled to the various
protections of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”34 Thus,
twenty years before the Supreme Court’s plurality opinion in Stop the
Beach, the First Circuit asserted its authority to decide whether statecreated interests are protected by the federal Takings Clause.
C. Ninth Circuit Precedents
Before Vandevere v. Lloyd, the Ninth Circuit’s Takings Clause
analysis was consistent with First Circuit and Supreme Court
precedents. While purporting to rely on its 1998 decision in
Schneider v. California Department of Corrections, the Ninth Circuit
in Vandevere omitted significant, essential portions of that case.35 In
Schneider, prison inmates challenged a policy based on California
Penal Code section 5808, which directed the State to deposit in a
communal-welfare account all interest earned on individual “Inmate
Trust Accounts” (“ITA”) while each prisoner-beneficiary was
incarcerated.36 The prisoners argued that by not paying to each
inmate the interest earned on his ITA, the State effected “a taking of
private property for public purposes.”37 The district court dismissed
the challenge—relying both on section 5808 and the lack of a
provision “allowing or requiring the Director of Corrections to pay
interest earned from funds in an ITA to an inmate”38—and
concluded that California law did not specifically create a positive
property right to the interest earned on a prisoner’s ITA.39
33. Id. at 615.
34. Id.
35. Schneider II, 151 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 1998).
36. Id. at 1195–96.
37. Id. at 1196.
38. Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. (Schneider I), 957 F. Supp. 1145, 1147–48 (N.D.
Cal. 1997), rev'd, 151 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 1998)
39. Id. at 1148–49.
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The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, disagreeing that the
California statute was controlling. The court held that California
prisoners did “possess a constitutionally [protected] property interest
that trigger[ed] Takings Clause scrutiny.”40 In analyzing the takings
claim, the court noted that California law, besides creating no
property right to the interest earned on an ITA, appeared to reject
that any property interest existed at all.41 But the fact that positive
state law either failed to create or expressly denied the existence of a
property interest did not end the Takings Clause inquiry.42 Citing
two Supreme Court cases,43 the Ninth Circuit asserted that
“property rights can—and often do—exist despite statutes . . . that
appear to deny their existence.”44 The court went on to establish
several guiding principles for determining what property rights are
protected:
[T]here is . . . a “core” notion of constitutionally protected
property into which state regulation simply may not intrude
without prompting Takings Clause scrutiny. The States’ power visa-vis property thus operates as a one-way ratchet of sorts: States
may . . . confer “new property” status on interests located outside
the core of constitutionally protected property, but they may not
encroach upon traditional “old property” interests found within the
core.45

40. Schneider II, 151 F.3d at 1201. Just three months before Vandevere was decided,
the First Circuit in Young v. Wall, 642 F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 2011), rejected the Ninth Circuit’s
holding in Schneider, concluding that since inmates held fewer property rights than others at
common law, and no state case law suggested a right for inmates to receive earned-interest
income on their personal accounts, inmates did not have a constitutionally protected property
interest. Id. at 53–54. Interestingly, retired Associate Justice David Souter sat by designation
on the First Circuit panel in Young. Justice Souter’s dissent in Phillips—that the first prong,
whether an individual has a protected property interest, should never be separated from the
second prong, whether a compensable taking has occurred—addresses many concerns that later
occurred as a result of the holdings in Schneider and in Vandevere. See supra note 24 and
accompanying text.
41. Schneider II, 151 F.3d at 1199.
42. Id.
43. Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1998); Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies,
Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980).
44. Schneider II, 151 F.3d at 1199.
45. Id. at 1200–01 (footnote omitted).
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The court explained that “the core of constitutionally protected
property” is defined “by reference to traditional ‘background
principles’ of property law.”46 Considering a right to earned-interest
income as within the “core” of constitutionally protected property,
the court rejected the California statute and instead rested its
holding on the common-law rule that “interest follows principal.”47
The Ninth Circuit has also rejected the view that a state’s
appellate- and supreme-court decisions are binding—solely because
they classify an interest as a “privilege”—when determining what is
property for federal-law purposes. In Little v. United States, the
Ninth Circuit considered whether a taxpayer’s statutory right to
redeem property by paying outstanding property taxes to the state
constituted a property interest to which federal-tax liens could
attach.48 In arguing that his statutory right of redemption was not
“property or rights to property,” the taxpayer cited three California
cases holding that the right of redemption was “nothing more than a
personal privilege granted by statute.”49 The Ninth Circuit rejected
this argument, stating that “[s]imply because an interest is classified
as a ‘privilege’ under state law” does not end the inquiry.50 Rather,
the proper inquiry is whether under state law the interest is “an
economic asset in the sense that it has pecuniary worth and is
transferable, so that a claim can be enforced against it.”51 The court
then held that the taxpayer’s interest—a right of redemption—was “a
valuable right to property.”52
And in 2010, the Ninth Circuit in Ward v. Ryan reiterated the
view expressed in Schneider—that certain property rights are so
fundamental that “even if a statute does not explicitly create a
property interest, such right may nonetheless still exist.”53
46. Id. at 1201 (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029–30
(1992)).
47. Id. at 1200 (“The Webb’s and Phillips decisions are therefore similar to one another
(and germane to this case) in a critical respect: In both cases, the Court relied, in the face of a
contrary state statute, upon the traditional common law rule that ‘interest follows principal’ in
recognizing a protected property interest in earned interest income.”).
48. Little v. United States, 704 F.2d 1100, 1103–04 (9th Cir. 1983).
49. Id. at 1106.
50. Id. (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 1105–06 (footnote omitted).
52. Id. at 1106.
53. Ward v. Ryan, 623 F.3d 807, 812 (9th Cir. 2010).
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III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Facts of the Case

Since about 1978, Dyer Vandevere, John McCombs, Gary
Hollier, and John Jent (collectively “fishermen” or “Vandevere
plaintiffs”) have held permanent-entry permits to commercially fish
for salmon in Alaska’s Upper Cook Inlet.54 Two of the fishermen
hold permits to fish with drift gillnets, and the other two fishermen
hold permits to place set gillnets on submerged lands where they are
leaseholders.55 Entry permits are valuable assets that are transferable,
and the Commission has no authority to revoke them.56 As long as
the fishermen renew their entry permits at least every two years,57 the
permits carry many rights and benefits as property under Alaska law:
entry permits can be transferred and sold inter vivos;58 devised by
will, passed by right of survivorship, inherited through intestacy, and
exempted from creditors’ claims against the estate;59 executed against
for past-due child-support payments;60 treated as premarital property
in divorce proceedings;61 used to recover tort damages for another’s
actions that decrease their value;62 and pledged as security for certain
loans.63
The Alaska Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission
(“Commission”) “regulates entry into [Alaska’s] commercial
fisheries.”64 In 1996, the Commission began enacting regulations
that drastically shortened the drift-gillnet season to run only from
June 25 to August 9—shortening the season by seventy-five
percent.65
54. Vandevere v. Lloyd, 644 F.3d 957 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 850 (2011).
55. Id. at 961.
56. Id. at 966.
57. ALASKA STAT. § 16.43.150(c)–(d) (2010).
58. Id. § 16.43.170.
59. Id. § 16.43.150(h).
60. Anderson v. Anderson, 736 P.2d 320, 323–24 (Alaska 1987).
61. See Edelman v. Edelman, 3 P.3d 348, 351 (Alaska 2000).
62. See Edelman v. Edelman, 61 P.3d 1, 4 (Alaska 2002).
63. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 16.10.333–.338, 44.81.215, .225, 44.81.231–.250; see also
Brief of Appellants at 17, Vandevere v. Lloyd, 644 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2011) (No. 09-35957).
64. Vandevere, 644 F.3d at 960 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 16.43.100(a)(1)).
65. Id. at 961–62. Between 1980 and 1996, the fishing seasons were 190 days each year
(June 25 to December 31). Id. Since 1996, the fishing seasons have been only forty-six days
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B. Procedural History
In May 2007, the fishermen sued the Commission and sought an
injunction to prevent further enforcement of the new regulations.66
The fishermen claimed that the Commission’s regulations effected a
67
taking of their property; the shortened fishing seasons severely
limited the number of fish that the fishermen could catch and sell,
which directly diminished the value of their fishing permits.68 The
district court granted the Commission’s motion for summary
judgment, providing little to no separate analysis.69 Instead, relying
on the Alaska Supreme Court’s holding in Vanek v. State70—a nearly
identical case—the district court held that the fishermen “lack[ed] a
property interest in their entry permits” and that “they had not
suffered a due process violation.”71
IV. THE COURT’S DECISION
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed without dissent the district
court’s summary-judgment ruling against the fishermen. The Ninth
Circuit approached the Takings Clause analysis by breaking down
the inquiry into two separate steps. First, the fishermen were
required to show that their entry permits gave them a property
interest.72 Whether the entry permits created a property right was a
state-law question.73 Second, the court would determine whether a
regulatory taking without compensation had occurred, which was a
federal-law question.74 But the court would not turn to the second

each year (June 25 to August 9). Id.
66. Id. at 961.
67. The fishermen also claimed a due-process violation because there was inadequate
notice and opportunity to be heard when the regulations were passed. Id. at 969. Additionally,
the two fishermen who held leaseholds to submerged lands made a takings claim. Id. at 963.
Because these claims were dismissed on different rationales, they are beyond the scope of the
circuit split and of this Note.
68. Id. at 962.
69. Id. at 963.
70. Vanek v. State, 193 P.3d 283 (Alaska 2008).
71. Vandevere, 644 F.3d at 963.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 964.
74. Id. at 963–64 (“As to a question of federal law, including this one, we owe no
deference to state courts.”).

432

CLEMENTS.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

423

3/20/2012 11:33 AM

Judicial Takings in Vandevere v. Lloyd

step unless the fishermen could show that they had a constitutionally
protected property interest.75 Having determined that it was required
to follow the Alaska Supreme Court’s decision in Vanek v. State,76
the Ninth Circuit held that the fishermen’s entry permits were “not
property for purposes of a takings claim.”77 Accordingly, the court
concluded that the “second step of a full takings analysis” was
unnecessary.78
A. Two-Step Takings Clause Analysis
According to the Ninth Circuit, this two-step, state–federal
dichotomous approach to a takings analysis was recognized by the
Supreme Court, “albeit obliquely, in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council.”79 First, the Ninth Circuit looked to Lucas’s disposition and
reasoned that because the Supreme Court’s disagreement with the
state supreme court was unrelated to “the extent of the property
interest in the . . . land,” the posture of the remand order seemed to
“firmly suggest[]” that property interests are determined by state
law.80 Second, the Supreme Court’s decision expressly focused on
how far a state regulation could permissibly invade private property
without paying just compensation, which was a question of federal
law.81 Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the disposition in
Lucas82 appeared to indirectly suggest that “state law governs the
demarcation of a property right, while federal law governs the
manner in which the state must respect” that right.83

75. Id. at 963.
76. Vanek v. State, 193 P.3d 283 (Alaska 2008).
77. Vandevere, 644 F.3d at 967.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 964 (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)).
80. Id. (second emphasis added).
81. Id.
82. Notably, the Ninth Circuit also pointed to a procedural-due-process case in which
the Supreme Court first had found that several utility customers’ property rights were
“definitively established by decisions of the state courts,” and then had answered the federal
question whether the utility company had provided its customers sufficient due process before
turning off their utility services. Id. (citing Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436
U.S. 1, 9, 12 (1978)).
83. Id.
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1. State—but sometimes federal—law defines property rights
Having established some footing for its takings analysis, “albeit
obliquely,” the Ninth Circuit garnered more evidence showing that
its approach was not novel (at least for state-created licenses) by
pointing to Schneider v. California Department of Corrections.84 The
court explained that in Schneider, it had distinguished between “old
property” and “new property” rights.85 Regarding old property,
“which includes the more traditional forms of property based in the
common law”—such as the right to keep earned interest on one’s
principal funds—the Vandevere court seemed to imply that “federal
courts applying the [C]onstitution make the final call.”86 For new
property, which includes nontraditional property rights—such as
welfare entitlements, public employment, and state-created contracts
and licenses—state law effectively “can curtail or limit it with little
constitutional interference”87 because “state law has the final say on
what interests one possesses.”88
2. Circuit split between Schneider and Hoffman
The court felt there was an apparent “tension between [its]
analysis in Schneider and the First Circuit’s Takings Clause analysis in
Hoffman v. City of Warwick,” but the Ninth Circuit concluded that
its own precedent was superior for three reasons.89 First, the court
found Schneider to be more faithful to the two-step analysis it
recognized as implicit in Lucas.90 By contrast, Hoffman condensed
the analysis into a single inquiry in which “federal courts, guided by
their own precedents, decide both” steps, rather than the second step
alone.91 Second, the court found that it made more sense to apply

84. Schneider II, 151 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 1998).
85. Vandevere, 644 F.3d at 965.
86. Robert H. Thomas, Recent Developments in Regulatory Takings Law: What Counts
as “Property?”, 34 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP., no. 9, Oct. 2011, at 5, available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/71176492/Thomas-Recent-Developments-in-RegulatoryTakings-Law-What-Counts-as-Property-34-Zoning-Planning-Law-Report-Oct-2011.
87. Id.
88. Vandevere, 644 F.3d at 965.
89. Id. (citing Hoffman v. City of Warwick, 909 F.2d 608 (1st Cir. 1990)).
90. Id. at 966.
91. Id.
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state law to decide whether entry permits were property, while
Hoffman indicated that state law did not have the “final say” in that
regard.92 Third, the court found that principles of stare decisis
mandated that it follow Schneider and not Hoffman.93
B. Deference to the Alaska Supreme Court
Alaska state law had spawned the “creature” at issue—entry
permits—and the Ninth Circuit found that it was powerless to
consider the extent or existence of any property interest independent
of “a relevant decision by the state’s highest court.”94 Three years
before, the Alaska Supreme Court had held in Vanek v. State that
fishers’ entry permits were not property interests for takings-analysis
purposes.95 The Ninth Circuit conducted a brief analysis, limited to
determining whether Vanek was dispositive on the entry-permit
issue. The court summarized the Vanek plaintiffs’ arguments, noting
that the “Vanek plaintiffs’ arguments . . . echoed the arguments that
Plaintiffs advance here.”96
The Vanek plaintiffs argued that their entry permits had all the
characteristics of property: an entry permit was economically valuable
and transferable; was entitled to due-process protection; could serve
as collateral to secure a loan; could be devised by will or inherited by
right of survivorship; was property or a right to property for federal-

92. Id. (“It would be anomalous to conclude that, in the absence of a statutory or
contractual provision for compensation, the state must compensate those regulated when the
state regulates an interest that the state itself created in the first place and explicitly made
subject to future regulation.”).
93. Id. (“In any event, Schneider is the law of our circuit and we are bound to follow
it.”).
94. Id.
95. Id. (citing Vanek v. State, 193 P.3d 283, 285, 288 (Alaska 2008)).
96. Id. (citing Vanek, 193 P.3d at 285). At first glance, the court’s reasoning for
summarizing the Vanek plaintiffs’ arguments and not the Vandevere plaintiffs’ arguments
might seem perfectly logical. But this maneuver is particularly problematic for two reasons.
First, in accepting the Vandevere plaintiffs’ appeal, the court essentially agreed to give the
fishermen their day in court—deciding their case on its merits. But the court failed to give the
Vandevere plaintiffs these courtesies by categorically lumping their arguments with those of the
Vanek plaintiffs. The court merely recited the Alaska Supreme Court’s analysis without
conducting any real analysis of its own. Second, and more troubling, the Vandevere plaintiffs
advanced myriad, distinct arguments that were never considered by the Ninth Circuit (and
certainly were not considered by the state supreme court). See Brief of Appellants at 10–30,
Vandevere v. Lloyd, 644 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2011) (No. 09-35957).
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tax-lien purposes; and was “subject to execution for past due child
support claims.”97 Additionally, the Board of Fisheries had no power
to revoke, suspend, or modify entry permits.98 The State’s argument,
which the Alaska Supreme Court ultimately accepted, was that
permit holders had “nothing more than a use privilege or license to
fish, subject to all applicable regulations adopted by the board of
Fisheries.”99
The Ninth Circuit zeroed in on four factors supporting the
Alaska Supreme Court’s decision. First, an Alaska statute specifically
provided that “[a]n entry permit constitutes a use privilege that may
be modified or revoked by the legislature without compensation.”100
Thus, the plain language of the statute denied the existence of a
compensable property interest.101 Second, a 1979 Attorney General
Opinion stated that legislative enactments affecting the nature of
entry permits would not require just compensation because entry
permits “ha[d] not acquired the status of a property right.”102 Third,
a student-written law-review article stated that the Alaska Senate in
1990 had rejected the notion that entry permits conferred any
property right.103 “Finally, the [state] court examined at length its
own precedents and the effect of state constitutional provisions that
reserve fish to the people for common use and ban exclusive rights in
fisheries.”104
Relying on the Alaska Supreme Court’s opinion, the Ninth
Circuit held that entry permits were not property for takings-claim
purposes; step two in the Takings Clause analysis was therefore
unnecessary.105

97. Vanek, 193 P.3d at 288–89, 291, 293.
98. Id. at 288.
99. Id.
100. ALASKA STAT. § 16.43.150(e) (2011).
101. Vanek, 193 P.3d at 289 (“The legislature’s ‘use privilege’ language establishes that
the permits are merely licenses to fish that are subject to government regulation.”).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 289 & n.21 (citing Jon David Weiss, Note, A Taxing Issue: Are Limited Entry
Fishing Permits Property?, 9 ALASKA L. REV. 93, 96, 112 (1992)).
104. Vandevere v. Lloyd, 644 F.3d 957, 966–67 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 850
(2011) (citations omitted).
105. Id. at 967. As noted before, the Ninth Circuit also disposed of the claims of the two
fishermen who held shore-fishery leases. The court first recited a few relevant sections from the
fishermen’s boilerplate lease agreements—contracts that all fishery leaseholders were required
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V. ANALYSIS

Takings Clause analysis should not be divided into two separate
bodies of law—state law to determine property interests and federal
law to determine whether a compensable taking occurred. Likewise,
it is “wrong to separate Takings Clause analysis of the property rights
at stake from analysis of the alleged deprivation.”106 The two prongs
are bound up together as a mixed question of state and federal law.
The Ninth Circuit created this anomalous, two-step rule only after
incorrectly applying the Supreme Court’s decision in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council.107 And by deferring to the Alaska Supreme
Court, the Ninth Circuit failed to consider on its own the nature and
extent of the benefits and rights that entry-permit holders enjoyed
under Alaska law. This is problematic because, as the Ninth Circuit
previously recognized in Schneider v. California Department of
Corrections, property rights can—and often do—exist despite state
laws denying their existence.108 If the Ninth Circuit had properly
applied Schneider’s analysis, it would have recognized that entry
permits confer a large bundle of rights identical to the rights that
people get “when they obtain title to property.”109
A. Lucas Does Not Firmly Suggest a Two-Step Inquiry
The Supreme Court in Lucas never suggested—not even
“obliquely”—that two separate analyses should be conducted to
determine whether a state has effected a regulatory taking.110
Relatedly, and despite the Ninth Circuit’s claim otherwise, the
Court’s remand order in Lucas does not “suggest[] that state law

to sign. Then the court concluded that the “lease plainly exempts regulatory takings of the
kind challenged here from the requirement that Plaintiffs receive just compensation.” Id. at
969. While the Alaska Supreme Court had held that fishery leaseholders of submerged land
had a “limited property interest,” id. at 967, the Ninth Circuit did not address the fishermen’s
takings claim but held that the fishermen had “contractually waived their right to challenge the
regulations when they signed their lease agreements.” Id. at 969.
106. Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 180 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
107. Vandevere, 644 F.3d at 966 (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003
(1992)).
108. Schneider II, 151 F.3d 1194, 1199 (9th Cir. 1998).
109. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027.
110. Vandevere, 644 F.3d at 964 (stating that the Supreme Court recognized a two-step,
state–federal law approach to a Takings Clause analysis, “albeit obliquely,” in Lucas).
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governs the demarcation of a property right.”111 Rather, the Court’s
remand order expressly required that South Carolina (if it wanted to
avoid paying compensation) justify its prohibition on Lucas’s desired
use—building a home—by reference to state common-law principles
of property and nuisance.112 This is exactly what the State “would be
required to do if it sought to restrain Lucas in a common-law action
for public nuisance.”113 In other words, the State’s reliance on new
legislative findings alone was insufficient to justify its confiscatory
regulation, which prevented “all economically beneficial use of
land.”114 Additionally, the Court answered the question whether any
background principle of property law or nuisance law existed to
justify the prohibition: building a home was an “essential” land use
that was unlikely to have been prohibited by common-law
principles.115 Thus, contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation,
Lucas stands for the view that a state’s statutory law is limited—not
empowered—in its ability to define away property rights.116
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning—that Lucas’s remand
order had nothing to do with the extent of the property interest and
thus was evidence that state law controlled—is a non-sequitur.117
Logically speaking, the argument is invalid because it denies the
antecedent, taking the following form: If (A), then (B). (Not-A).
So, (not-B). To make sense of how the court’s reasoning is faulty,
one must supply the implicit premises, (A) and (B), because the
court’s argument made explicit only the contrapositives, (Not-A)
and (Not-B). Thus, the argument with its implicit premises reads as
follows:

111. Id.
112. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1029.
115. Id. at 1031 (“It seems unlikely that common-law principles would have prevented
the erection of any habitable or productive improvements on [Lucas’s] land; they rarely
support prohibition of the ‘essential use’ of land.” (citation omitted)).
116. Id. at 1029–30.
117. Vandevere, 644 F.3d at 964 (“[T]he Court’s quarrel with the state supreme court
did not concern the extent of the property interest in the beachfront land, which the Court’s
remand order firmly suggests is a matter of state law but, rather, concerned the extent to which
the state could invade a property interest without providing just compensation, which is a
matter of federal law.”).
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If (A) Lucas’s remand order concerned the extent of the property
interest, then (B) the extent of the property interest is not a matter
of state law. (Not-A) Lucas’s remand order “did not concern the
extent of the property interest.” So, (not-B) “the extent of the
property interest” “is a matter of state law.”118

Practically speaking, however, even if the court’s argument were
valid, it would still miss the point. The Supreme Court made evident
the extent of Lucas’s property interest,“a fee simple interest,” which
was “an estate with a rich tradition of protection at common law”
and clearly not unique to the state’s statutory law.119 The Supreme
Court did suggest, however, that property interests could be
identified in future cases by looking to how a state’s property laws
have shaped “the owner’s reasonable expectations.”120 Put another
way, courts should ask “whether and to what degree the State’s law
has accorded legal recognition and protection to the particular
interest.”121 Thus, while correctly looking to principles of state law to
identify the fishermen’s property interests, the Ninth Circuit
incorrectly halted its inquiry after a cursory examination revealed a
single statutory provision and a state-supreme-court decision that
were seemingly controlling.
B. Takings Analysis: Mixed Question of State Law and Federal Law
The Ninth Circuit’s mischaracterization of Lucas effectively
ended the inquiry. If federal courts refuse to consider on their own
“what is property” by looking to the legal recognitions and
protections given an interest under state law, states can continue to
legislate away property rights and thereby escape the Takings Clause
inquiry altogether. If every court were to take that approach, it
would always end the inquiry.
Fifth Amendment claims of uncompensated takings no doubt
present mixed questions of state law and federal law. For the
Constitution itself does not create property rights; rather,
“independent source[s]”—such as state law, common law, and

118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. (emphasis omitted).
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7.
Id.
Id.
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federal law—confer property rights.122 Because the Constitution
protects property interests that various sources of law confer on
individuals, the first prong of the Takings Clause analysis is
necessarily bound up with second prong. Thus, while a state’s
common law or statutory law might be the source of a property
right, the total inquiry is whether there has been an unconstitutional
taking of that right. It therefore makes little sense to divorce the two
prongs when they are naturally bound up as a single constitutional
question.
The Alaska Supreme Court’s determination that entry permits
are not property for Takings Clause purposes is equivalent to a
determination that there has not been an uncompensated taking.
Because the takings inquiry is a constitutional question, the Ninth
Circuit owed no deference to the state supreme court. As one
professor has argued:
[T]he nature of the federal courts’ authority to enforce the Takings
Clause with respect to state-created property rights dictates that
they have the jurisdiction to review final state court judgments that
purportedly eliminate established property rights and to decide
what property rights existed under state law [before] the challenged
decision.123

If this were not the case—if federal courts were truly powerless to
consider how an interest is treated under state law without deferring
to a relevant decision of the state’s supreme court—the state
judiciary would be granted unlimited discretion to violate the
Takings Clause.
Yet the Ninth Circuit in Vandevere erroneously deferred entirely
to the analysis and holding of the Alaska Supreme Court on this
mixed question of constitutional law. Only one Alaska statute
actually states that entry permits are “use privileges,” while
numerous other statutes and decisions by the Alaska Supreme Court
give entry permits heightened protections and recognize them as

122. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
123. Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Legal Castles in the Sand: The Evolution of Property
Law, Culture, and Ecology in Coastal Lands, 61 SYRACUSE L. REV. 213, 225 (2011) (citing
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2608–10
(2010)).

440

CLEMENTS.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

423

3/20/2012 11:33 AM

Judicial Takings in Vandevere v. Lloyd

property interests.124 And as the Ninth Circuit has recognized in its
prior cases, once a state applies its “one-way ratchet” to confer new
property status on nontraditional interests, the state cannot then
declare that the interest was never property to begin with simply by
classifying it as a “privilege.”125 Alaska conferred new property status
on entry permits by making them, among other things, transferable,
nonrevocable, inheritable by right of survivorship, devisable by will,
subject to execution for past-due child-support payments, and usable
as collateral to secure a loan.126 Alaska could not then declare that
entry permits were never property to begin with simply by pointing
to the statutory language classifying them as a “use privilege.”
C. The Vandevere Test Facilitates Judicial Takings
The Vandevere court’s deference to the Alaska Supreme Court’s
judicial taking is contrary both to Supreme Court precedent and,
ironically, to the court’s own declaration that it would not so defer.
The Vandevere court seemingly adopted the plurality view in Stop the
Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental
Protection.127 The plurality argued that an actor from any branch of
government, including the judiciary, could effect a taking:128 “It
would be absurd to allow a State to do by judicial decree what the
Takings Clause forbids it to do by legislative fiat.”129 The Vandevere
court echoed this same view in an extended footnote:
[A]ny branch of state government could . . . effect a taking. We
also note that a federal court remains free to conclude that a state
supreme court’s purported definition of a property right really
amounts to a subterfuge for removing a pre-existing, staterecognized property right. That is, we need not take a state court at
its word as to the kind of analysis that it is performing.130

124. See supra Part III.A and sources cited notes 56–63.
125. See Schneider II, 151 F.3d 1194, 1200–01 (9th Cir. 1998); Little v. United States,
704 F.2d 1100, 1106 (9th Cir. 1983).
126. See supra Part III.A, notes 56–63, Part IV.B, notes 97–98.
127. Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2592.
128. Id. at 2602 (plurality opinion).
129. Id. at 2601.
130. Vandevere v. Lloyd, 644 F.3d 957, 964 n.4 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 850
(2011) (citations omitted).
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But the court gave only lip service to this idea. The Alaska
Supreme Court had recharacterized entry permits—treated under
Alaska law as property or rights to property in at least nine different
ways—by essentially concluding that entry permits were generally
treated as property interests except for purposes of the Takings
Clause.131 And the Vandevere court did precisely what it vowed not
to do: it took a state court at its word and deferred to the state
court’s analysis.132 The court blindly followed the Alaska Supreme
Court’s decision to effect a judicial taking of private property
without compensation. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit created a new
rule that facilitates judicial takings—giving state supreme courts
almost-exclusive discretion to determine which property interests are
constitutionally protected.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the Ninth Circuit purported to follow precedent, its
decision in Vandevere v. Lloyd breaks from precedent and creates a
circuit split. The court’s prior approach in Schneider did not actually
conflict with the First Circuit’s analysis in Hoffman v. City of
Warwick. In fact, Vandevere diverges from both Schneider and Lucas
to create a Takings Clause analysis that gives states nearly complete
discretion to decide whether property interests are protected by the
U.S. Constitution.
The Ninth Circuit should have accurately applied its Takings
Clause analysis from Schneider and asserted its power to review
decisions of a state supreme court. The court should have held that
the Alaska Supreme Court’s purported definition of entry permits
“really amount[ed] to a subterfuge for removing a pre-existing,
state-recognized property right.”133 Instead, the court ratified the
state court’s judicial taking when it declared that entry permits are
not property interests.

131. Vanek v. State, 193 P.3d 283, 292–94 (Alaska 2008).
132. Vandevere, 644 F.3d at 967 (“On this question of state law, which is the same as the
first question that we face here, we must follow Vanek. Therefore, in reliance on this recent
opinion of the Alaska Supreme Court, we hold that Plaintiffs’ entry permits are not property
for purposes of a takings claim.”).
133. Vandevere, 644 F.3d at 964 n.4.
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This Note has shown by reductio ad absurdum134 that the Ninth
Circuit’s analysis in Vandevere is logically inconsistent and stands as
proof that its test leads to an absurd result: it “allow[s] a State to do
by judicial decree what the Takings Clause forbids it to do by
legislative fiat.”135 Thus, Vandevere should be overruled.
While the issue presented to the Ninth Circuit was undoubtedly
difficult, the court has an ever-present duty to apply federalconstitutional principles to vindicate private-property rights—
particularly when state actions improperly define away by legislation,
invade by regulation, or destroy by judicial declaration the
individual’s Fifth Amendment right to just compensation.
Cory S. Clements*

134. Latin for “reduction to the absurd,” reductio ad absurdum is a “method of proving
the falsity of a premise by showing that its logical consequence is absurd or contradictory.”
Reductio ad absurdum, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/
reductio+ad+absurdum (last visited Mar. 10, 2012).
135. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592,
2601 (2010) (plurality opinion).
 J.D. candidate, April 2013, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young
University.
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